Introduction
The European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE) have rightly been called "natural born twins". 1 Putting fundamental differences aside, it is evident that the two, born more or less at the same time, 2 share a number of important goals, created both in order to serve the development of Europe and to deal with the aftermath of the cataclysms of the fi rst half of the 20 th century. Notwithstanding an attempt de facto * Lecturer in European Law, University of Groningen. The author would like to thank Fabian Amtenbrink, Gareth Davies, Laurence Gormley and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on some ideas expressed in the article, and also Siniša Rodin for the kind invitation to present the fi rst draft at the seminar 'Advanced Issues of European Law' in Dubrovnik in the spring of 2005. to eliminate the then young European Coal and Steel Community by incorporating it into the CoE under the Eden Plan, 3 the relations between the CoE and EU are constructive and friendly. Cooperation between them has been growing in recent years and is expected to grow even further. 4 The European Council has been optimistic on this issue. 5 After all, the two organisations also share a number of Member States: membership of the CoE has always largely coincided with that of the Communities.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the deterioration of the dictatorial regimes in the East of the European continent offered an historic opportunity to both the EU and the CoE to put the division of Europe to an end and to extend their membership to the ex-communist states. The drastic changes taking place in Europe at the end of the last century did not only have an impact on the geographical scope of the jurisdiction of the twins in question. They also provided an impetus for the development of European integration. 6 Clearly, it seems to be no coincidence that the Wall fell in 1989 and that the EU was born with a Treaty signed in 1992. 9 Extending EU jurisdiction to the territory of the former DDR is not counted as a separate round of enlargement since it was regulated by German law, not by the EU enlargement Member States it had before 1989. The CoE was enlarging even faster. As many as 23 countries have joined the CoE since the beginning of 1990.
The enlargement saga is far from over, however. While the CoE is likely to see the accession of Montenegro in the nearest future, 10 the EU will embrace two other states (Bulgaria and Romania) already in 2007 11 and more will join later on. Three countries currently enjoy candidate country status, including Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey. 12 Moreover, a number of countries in Europe, Africa and the Caucasus have made it clear that accession to the EU is among their main foreign policy objectives. These countries include Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, 13 Georgia, Montenegro, 14 Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. 15 A number of other States, such as San-Marino, 16 are studying the possibilities of joining. Among the countries of Eastern Europe (not counting Russia), only Belarus under the rule of president Lukashenka is not expressing any membership ambitions. 17 All in all, while the CoE seems to have largely used all its enlargement possibilities, the European Union stands somewhere in the middle of its enlargement road -in the future, enlargements are likely to stay on the agenda of the EU for several decades at least. It is not among the goals of this article to provide a detailed account of the accession law of the two organisations. 18 Instead, the paper will explore the role played by the monitoring of the level of human rights protection in the course of the preparation of accession to the EU and the CoE, and the instruments available in the law of the two organisations to make such monitoring effective. This article suggests that the human rights monitoring conducted by the EU was strongly infl uenced by the monitoring of the same countries by the CoE, and welcomes such developments. Clearly, the expertise of the CoE in the fi eld of human rights protection, and especially in the area of standard setting, is undisputed.
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Viewed in this light, it is suggested that the EU would only benefi t if, in the course of the preparations for future enlargements, it openly relied on the fi ndings of the CoE and tried to incorporate the CoE monitoring into the pre-accession assessment of the candidate countries' readiness to accede to the Union. Although the warm relations between the CoE and the EU allow us to speculate that such developments might become legally possible, at present the Community institutions are not obliged to build on the CoE fi ndings while regulating enlargements. At the same time, while such an obligation is lacking, given the fl exible nature of the regulation of the pre-accession exercise as established during the last enlargement, 20 it would be reasonable to suggest that taking the CoE monitoring results on-board would refl ect the human rights commitment of the Community institutions and would not be contrary to Community law. The development of human rights cooperation between the EU and the CoE in the regulation of future enlargements is thus strongly advocated and highly recommended. 
Structure of the argument
This paper consists of four sections. The fi rst one briefl y outlines the changes introduced into the EU enlargement law in the course of the preparation of the last enlargement in order to illustrate the rising importance of the assessment of the human rights situation in the candidate countries. This section also provides a sketch of the EU preaccession monitoring of the candidate countries' progress towards accession, including their adherence to the principle of the protection of human rights (I). The second section focuses on the structure of the CoE monitoring system, also discussing the parallels between the CoE human rights monitoring of the new members and the EU monitoring of the candidate countries' human rights record (II). The third section explores the diffi culties encountered by the Community institutions in the fi eld of the pre-accession human rights standard setting. It underlines the importance of the role played by the CoE. The latter organisation has actually acted in the capacity of a standard provider for the Commission, especially in the areas lying outside the scope of the acquis communautaire (III). Building on the assumption that the CoE monitoring standards and fi ndings played a prominent role in the preparation of the last enlargement of the EU, the last section of the paper draws parallels between the EU and CoE monitoring in some concrete fi elds, providing tangible examples of areas where CoE standards were actually used by the EU. These examples are concerned both with the general structuring of the pre-accession human rights monitoring conducted by the Commission and the (partial) use by the EU of some issue-specifi c standards developed by the CoE (IV).
The paper concludes by stating that the similarities between the goals of the two organisations, coupled with the principled positions both of them take vis-à-vis the protection of human rights in Europe, will help to make the EU pre-accession exercise more effective by linking the human rights monitoring of the candidate countries conducted by the Community institutions on the one hand, with the fi ndings of the CoE on the other hand. Careful analysis of the pre-accession monitoring conducted by the Commission during the preparation of the last enlargement clearly demonstrates that such borrowing of human rights standards and fi ndings by the Community has already started. Any developments related to the legal incorporation of the CoE monitoring fi ndings into the EU enlargement law will thus build on the existing practice and are likely to have a positive effect on the development and functioning of the EU enlargement law at large.
I. The role of human rights protection in the EU enlargement law
The fi rst enlargement of the EU (then the three Communities) did not accord any crucial importance to human rights protection. 21 Just as in the case of democracy and the rule of law, 22 human rights were not on the agenda mainly for two reasons: the main accent was placed on the economic nature of the Communities, 23 and it was presumed that the national human rights protection systems of the fi rst three applicants (the UK, Denmark and Ireland) were functioning well enough in order to assure effective human rights protection. Later enlargements, although crucially different from the fi rst one in many respects, did not grant importance to an assessment of human rights protection either.
However, the fi fth (2004) enlargement was a notable exception in this regard. Both presumptions allowing the Communities to disregard the importance of human rights protection in the course of the preparation of the previous enlargements largely did not hold for the fi fth enlargement. Between the fi rst and the beginning of the preparations for the fi fth enlargement, very much had changed.
Most importantly, the European integration project ceased to be viewed exclusively as an economic enterprise and was seen to embrace the principles of "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". 24 The language of rights became more easily accepted at the European level of governance; moreover, a special mechanism was built into the Treaty to guarantee that the Member States continued adhering to the main democratic and human rights principles. 25 The active position of the ECJ, 26 the legal articulation of the EU citizenship concept, 27 all played a role in underlining the importance of human rights in the EU legal system. Consequently, such a crucial rise in importance of the human rights protection ideals for the European integration project obviously could not but bring signifi cant innovations to the European Union enlargement law. 28 The second presumption concerning the suffi cient guarantees of human rights protection in the national legal orders of the Member States also largely lost its appeal. This mostly occurred as a result of the EU's fear "to go to bed with bad guys", as Jan Klabbers put it, 29 and thus owes much to the important transformation brought to Europe by the ending of the Cold War. Simply put, the EU lacked trust in the depth of transformation in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and needed to be constantly reassured of the fundamental character of the change taking place in the region. Although it has been argued that the loss of trust might be a signal of the end of the "old-days' integration" based on the "feeling of Community" and brotherhood, 30 it would have been overtly naïve to expect the Union to embrace new members whose human rights record and democratic future were vague and unstable.
In other words, the changes in the EU enlargement law, incorporating the assessment of the human rights protection record of the candidates, were caused by two sets of objective factors: the evolution of the European Union itself, and the nature of the applicants for membership -i.e. post-communist states in transition.
The change in the EU enlargement law which was aimed at responding to the aforementioned developments did not focus exclusively on human rights. It incorporated the overall assessment of the candidate 27 candidates and the prospects to continue benefi ting from the fi nancial assistance and, most importantly, the very prospect of entering the EU in the future. 36 This crucial link, making the Copenhagen criteria de facto a legal instrument, was articulated in the Accession Partnerships (APs). 37 Moreover, the Commission was entrusted with conducting the regular monitoring of the candidate countries' compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and meeting the priorities set in the APs.
As a result of these developments, a whole system of monitoring the candidates' progress was set up by the EU, making the legal framework of the fi fth enlargement quite unique in EU history. Never before was the Union so intrusive in the national reforms going on in the candidate countries, especially in matters where it usually does not possess any competences, lying partially or entirely outside the scope of the acquis communautaire. 38 However, all these changes largely did not fi nd any refl ection in the Treaty text, increasing the gap between the enlargement law and enlargement practice, in place since the fi rst enlargement, which makes it possible to speak about the birth of the customary enlargement law of the EU.
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In the fi eld of human rights, the pre-accession strategy built on the Copenhagen political criterion, requiring the candidate countries to put the systems of protection of human rights in place and to assure respect for and protection of minorities within their borders. Further on, this paper will confi ne itself to deal solely with this particular aspect of preaccession, since it is the fi eld best comparable to the core activities of the CoE.
The issues considered by the European Commission as relevant for pre-accession are discussed in the Copenhagen-related documents. 40 These documents, adopted by the Commission and the Council in the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, are thus at the core of the EU monitoring of the candidate countries' progress.
They include the Commission's Opinions of the CEECs' applications for membership of the EU, the Commission's Annual Reports on the candidate countries' progress towards accession, the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports adopted by the Commission regarding the progress made by the candidate countries after the signing of the Accession Treaty but before its entry into force, the Commission's Papers summarising the fi ndings of the reports and framing the future developments in the candidate countries, and the Accession Partnerships, released in the form of Council Decisions.
A structural analysis of all these instruments reveals that, in dealing with human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the Commission divided all the issues into three main parts: Civil and Political Rights, Economic and Social Rights, and Minority Protection. The criticism of the substance of this division and the inclusion of minor issues into one of these three categories, which seems to be quite spontaneous, 41 deserves separate assessment and will not be dealt with here. Focusing on the issues considered by the EU to be problematic, the Copenhagen-related documents present a narrower picture of the assessment of human rights protection than the list of rights included, for example, in the ECHR or the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 42 For example, they do not contain separate assessments of dignity 43 or the right to life. 44 Such a position can partly be explained as follows. Firstly, there is no reason to include in the pre-accession assessment the list of rights which are not widely violated in the candidate countries. Secondly, with a view to the absence of a Union human rights policy, 45 and taking into account the fragmented character of human rights protection in the EU, 46 41 To provide one example, in the course of regular reporting, the Commission was constantly unsure where to put the assessment of freedom of religion. In approximately half of the Reports it is considered as a civil and political right, while in the other half it is seen as an economic, social and cultural right. the Commission was probably restrained by the lack of internal human rights competence 47 while formulating the areas of pre-accession assessment in the fi eld of human rights.
48 Such a position is not surprising considering the at times dubious human rights record of the ECJ, 49 as well as the lack of standards the Commission could apply in the course of the pre-accession. 50 Thus, given the law of the day and the numerous responsibilities related to the conduct of enlargement lying on the Commission, probably the best option for it was to interpret the human rights pre-accession criterion as narrowly as possible.
The above-mentioned considerations notwithstanding, it could be argued that it might be necessary at least to mention that the EU is willing to protect and promote a wider scope of human rights than those mentioned in the Copenhagen-related documents. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) heard cases coming from candidate countries that dealt, for example, with the violation of the right to life. This can be regarded as proof that in some countries the situation is not ideal even in the case of the most basic rights, especially regarding the situation of ethnic and other minorities. 51 The set of rights on which the Commission was focusing was, however, quite wide and included: the freedom of expression and independence of the media; access to a lawyer; discrimination against homosexuals; human rights violations related to pre-trial detention and the situation in prisons; equality; freedom of religion. To summarise, EU enlargement law as it stands before the sixth enlargement (to accept Bulgaria and Romania 52 ) empowers the EU to check the level of compliance of the candidate countries with the human rights protection ideal, set, fi rst of all, by the Copenhagen political criterion. In order to assure the effectiveness of such compliance, regular monitoring of the human rights situation in the candidate countries has been conducted by the Commission and the Council, as part of the pre-accession programme.
Importantly, with a view to the progressive legal essence of the last enlargement -building on the principle of conditionality -and the nature of the present candidate countries and likely applicants, which are all countries in the process of recovery after violent confl icts, or which are in transition as they deal with their totalitarian past, it is perfectly clear that conditionality and human rights monitoring as a necessary part of enlargement preparation are here to stay. It is very unlikely that the EU would take a step back and return to a looser enlargement regulation, which was in place before the former People's Democracies started to join.
II. CoE monitoring system
The EU is not the only, and arguably not the most important, actor dealing with human rights protection on the European continent. Leadership in this area belongs to the CoE, established solely for the purpose of human rights protection. Faced with the same challenges in accepting as Members the former totalitarian countries, the CoE, just like the EU, has adopted a monitoring programme, which is essentially similar to that implemented in the course of pre-accession by the EU, although a number of crucial differences can also be seen. Most importantly, CoE monitoring largely starts after the accession of the country in question to the CoE. This strategy allows the CoE to use the whole spectrum of legal and political tools to infl uence the human rights policy of the country in question. 53 Unlike in the case of the EU, where all the candidate and associated countries largely remain outside the ECJ's jurisdiction, 54 since the acquis only com-52 Some scholars and the Commission regard the upcoming round of enlargement as the continuation of the fi fth round. It seems illogical, however, given that a new Treaty of Accession has been drafted for Romania and Bulgaria, making a clear case for the accession of these two countries to be regarded as the sixth round of enlargement. 53 The Communities used to apply similar strategies in relation to the economic development of the candidates. Greece, for example, entered the Communities even though the review of the Greek economy made by the Commission contained largely negative assessments. 
a. PACE monitoring system
The Commission's Reports that preceded the fi fth enlargement contain information on the instances where the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE takes a decision to stop the monitoring of a certain EU candidate country, 56 regarding this information as a positive development on the way to accession. These brief accounts deserve close study, since they refer to the outcomes of a monitoring exercise which is, as stated earlier, in many ways similar to that conducted by the Commission, although it is exclusively focused on the issues related to the protection of human rights. Acknowledging the successful completion of such monitoring in relation to the candidate countries, the Commission approves of the job done by the CoE and in a way relies on the results obtained by this organisation. Although the closure of the monitoring procedure by the CoE is probably not among the strict requirements the candidate countries have to satisfy before accession, CoE monitoring plays an important part in the pre-accession process (even though this importance is not underlined by the Commission).
Having had monitoring functions for many years, 57 PACE's role in the promotion of the CoE member countries' compliance with the obligations stemming from CoE membership increased signifi cantly after the 59 with a view to strengthening the Assembly's monitoring procedure.
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According to the Order, several Committees were charged with monitoring functions, including the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights and the Political Affairs Committee. The Committee on Relations with Non-Member Countries was also involved in the process, releasing opinions concerning the Member States previously enjoying special guest status. 61 These Committees had to report directly to the Assembly and were instructed to come up with draft Resolutions "in which clear proposals are made for the improvement of the situation in the country under consideration".
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The Order described a number of tools available to the Assembly to sanction poorly performing member countries. It outlined such tools as non-ratifi cation of the credentials of a national parliamentary delegation at the beginning of the next ordinary session of the Assembly 63 or addressing a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers to launch the procedure of Article 8 of the Statute of the CoE (SCoE), 64 which is similar in effect to Article 7 EU in the Union legal system and allows for the suspension of the rights of representation of the state violating its obligations. Unlike its EU counterpart, Article 8 SCoE even allows for a request to withdraw from the CoE. Importantly, "if such member does not comply with this request, the Committee [of Ministers] may decide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may determine". 65 Without any doubt, the positive outcome of the monitoring process under Order No. 508 was vital for the continuation of any given state's membership in the organisation. In other words, among other functions, the Monitoring Committee of PACE plays a role parallel to that played by the European Commission in the EU framework -the monitoring of the newcomers. Once again, the crucial difference between the EU and the CoE approach to monitoring is that in the EU the monitoring is done by the Commission prior to the candidate countries' accession to the Union, while in the CoE the monitoring 'should not commence until six months after the member state's accession to the Council of Europe'.
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According to Order No. 508, the Monitoring Committee's task (apart from the release of annual reports on its activities 69 ) is to draft an offi cial Assembly document -either a Resolution or a Recommendation as a result of the monitoring process of a given country. 70 Before the authorities of the monitored country give a response to the fi ndings of the Committee, these fi ndings remain confi dential.
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Since the adoption of Resolution 1115, the load of the Monitoring Committee has been considerable. Among other states, all the EU candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe have been monitored. 82 It is unfortunate that the Commission only briefl y mentions the closure of the CoE monitoring of the candidate countries in its Reports, without outlining the list of issues which can give rise to the re-opening of the monitoring procedure according to the Monitoring Committee. It seems that the general reporting by the European Commission could only win from paying more attention to the fi ndings of the CoE. This also concerns the possibility of Reporting on the follow-up procedures, which address issues of great importance. Only when both the Parliamentary Assembly monitoring and follow-up procedures are closed can the country in question be fully recognised as respecting its obligations stemming from CoE membership.
In other words, the fi ndings of the CoE organs are regarded by the European Commission as valuable sources of information, but this information is not fully used by the EU. The mentioning of several ECtHR cases and the observation that the monitoring of several candidate countries is closed can only be viewed as half-hearted use of valuable expert information concerning the same issues as those assessed in the Com- mission's Reports. The Commission's Reports could only improve if the CoE experience were used better. Making such improvement a reality is certainly possible in the nearest future. With the necessary commitment on the part of the Commission and other institutions, the next enlargement could see PACE monitoring better included in the candidate countries' progress assessment.
b. Monitoring administered by the Committee of Ministers
Although the Committee of Ministers is not directly mentioned by the Commission in the Copenhagen-related documents, it is necessary to briefl y outline the role it plays in the CoE monitoring system, since it can be involved in the imposition of sanctions (up to exclusion from the CoE) on the countries found by the Parliamentary Assembly to be in violation of human rights. 
c. Other bodies with monitoring functions
A number of other CoE bodies entrusted with human rights monitoring functions have not been mentioned in the Commission's Opinions and Reports. Among these bodies is the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), 85 reviewing the states' reports on compliance with the European Social Charter. The same Committee reviews collective complaints allowed for by the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter concerning the system of collective complaints. However, according to Shelton, there were no collective complaints submitted from the ten new EU Member States throughout the time of the Commission's reporting (by 2003). 86 Equally, the Commission's documents contain no reference to the activities of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). 87 The CPT functions by rendering visits to places of detention of any kind. Although concrete reports of the CPT are confi dential, 88 its annual reports might have been useful for the assessment of the situation in the candidate countries' prisons.
Another monitoring organ whose fi ndings are not referred to in the Commission's assessments is the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). 89 The mandate of the Commission includes tasks to "review member States' legislation, policies and other measures to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance, and their effectiveness; propose further action at local, national and European level; formulate general policy recommendations to member States and study international legal instruments applicable in the matter with a view to their reinforcement where appropriate". To summarise, the complex human rights monitoring system created by the CoE, while serving goals similar to those of the EU pre-accession monitoring in the sphere of human rights protection, is built along different lines and is structurally more complicated than the EU pre-accession monitoring system. The number of references the Commission made to the fi ndings of the CoE monitoring system is really minimal.
Apart from statements that the PACE monitoring of certain candidate countries is over (such information does not even appear in the context of the assessment of all the candidate countries' applications), the Commission appears unwilling to go into the details of the recommendations given by the CoE monitoring organs. Moreover, the Regular Reports released by the Commission in the course of the pre-accession exercise do not contain any information concerning the follow-up dialogue. By not including the follow-up dialogue, the Commission partially distorts the actual account of the state of play of human rights protection in the candidate countries, since new monitoring can be opened on the grounds of unfavourable follow-up reports. In other words, reporting that the PACE monitoring of a country is over only refl ects half of the picture.
Realising the usefulness of using the results of the CoE bodies monitoring programmes, the recent report on EU -CoE relations, written by Prime Minister Juncker of Luxembourg (in his personal capacity) 91 following the request of the heads of states and governments of the CoE, 92 recommended that an attempt be made to formally incorporate the CoE monitoring system within the EU enlargement law. 93 He stated, inter alia, that It would […] seem appropriate to me that EU bodies should give formal effect to the spirit of article 6(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, on which co-operation with the Council of Europe is based, by making it a working rule that the decisions, reports, conclusions, recommendations and opinions of these monitoring bodies:
1. will be systematically taken as the fi rst Europe-wide reference for human rights; 2. will be expressly cited as a reference in documents which they produce.
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The Prime Minister also clarifi ed that his proposals amounted to nothing more than recognition of the existing practice adopted by the 91 JC Juncker (n 4). Commission and other institutions, 95 which is confi rmed by an analysis of the preparation for the last enlargement. 96 Interestingly, Juncker's proposal was not solely confi ned to the PACE-conducted monitoring, but also concerned the monitoring conducted by other CoE bodies, as described above. 97 In other words, the idea of making wider use of the CoE expertise in the course of the preparation of EU enlargements is gaining in importance.
III. The issue of standard setting: Importance of the CoE monitoring system for the EU
CoE monitoring was particularly important for the EU during the preparation for the last enlargement because of the timing when it was conducted: it started years before the release in 1997 of the Commission's Opinions on the candidate countries' applications for membership of the EU (de facto launching the Regular Reporting exercise).
It can be argued that the CoE monitoring wins in comparison with the monitoring conducted by the EU due to the presence of a clear and understandable human rights protection standard in the CoE system, as refl ected, mostly, in ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Such a standard is certainly lacking in the EU, which is only guided by the principles of the ECHR, as refl ected in Article 6(2) EU. 98 The Convention in itself, although possessing "special signifi cance", 99 is merely a source of general principles, to be applied in the context of the Treaty Provisions. 100 Moreover, having no general competence as far as human rights protection is concerned, 101 the EU, legally speaking, could not have such a standard. Stunningly, this problem seems to have been totally ignored by the Commission in the documents it released in the course of regular reporting. In six Opinions on the candidate countries' applications for member- 95 Ibid 96 See IV., infra.
97 JC Juncker (n 4) 5. 
102
This statement is simply false and can only be applied to the principles of the Convention interpreted in conjunction with the norms of Community law. In other words, having general principles at hand, the EU still lacked a concrete standard to be applied in the course of pre-accession. The same is valid for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Let alone its ambiguous status as a proclaimed document, 103 according to Articles 51(2) and 54, it clearly does not apply to situations (including human rights violations) deemed to lie outside the scope of Community law.
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The Commission, perfectly aware of the lack of a general human rights protection standard uniformly applied to all the applicants in the course of pre-accession, never recognises that such a standard is missing, since it speaks about a "European standard". This capacity of the Commission to turn a blind eye to the limitations inherent in its position has prompted scholars to regard this institution as a prolifi c myth-maker. 105 While possessing no human rights standard, it did its best to convince the candidate countries that such a standard did exist, although it never gave them a chance to see it on paper.
Since the lack of Community competence in a given sphere does not mean that certain elements pertaining to this sphere cannot be assessed in the course of pre-accession, the creation of a standard like this does not per se contradict Community law. The date of a country's accession to the EU serves as a watermark here. As long as a given country is not a Member State, the Union is not bound by the limitations of competence applicable to its relations with the Member States and is thus free to act as it sees fi t. For example, the Union pressured Latvia and Estonia to amend their naturalisation legislation and achieved certain (albeit very limited) success in this exercise. 106 However, had Latvia and Estonia been EU Member States at the time when such pressure was exercised, the Union would not have stood any chance, since national citizenship regulation generally falls outside the scope of EU competences, as confi rmed by the ECJ in the Micheletti case.
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In other words, the lack of general human rights competence vis-à-vis the Member States could not prevent the Commission from elaborating a human rights standard for the acceding countries. The principle of conditionality and all the regular reporting exercises were something new to the EU enlargement practice. Consequently, the Commission could not draw on the experience of past enlargements as far as the human rights protection standard was concerned. The standard had to be created. Ultimately, the Commission ended up doing precisely this: it created a standard of human rights assessment in the candidate countries. However, since the EU did not appear to be willing to acknowledge that it did not have any standard of human rights protection at hand when the regular reporting started, neither was such a standard promulgated by the European Commission in the course of the previous enlargements (the Copenhagen criteria, being overbroad and extremely vague, can hardly qualify as a road-map for reform in the sphere of human rights protection or for the assessment of progress made by the candidate countries), such a standard was only created in the course of the assessment of the applicant countries' requests for membership of the EU. As a consequence, lacking in generality and consistency, the standard, which can be read between the lines of the Copenhagen-related documents, is mostly related to the concrete problems of the candidate countries.
At the same time, while dealing with European countries wishing to accede to the EU, the Commission's experts did not need to travel far around the continent for sources of inspiration. The Strasbourg human rights protection system, rightly considered by many to be the most advanced in the world, was clearly the most suitable tool.
IV. The borrowing of CoE fi ndings by the EU in the course of preaccession
Prime Minister Juncker was absolutely right in claiming that the use of CoE fi ndings by EU institutions is a day-to-day reality. Analysis of the substance of the Opinions on the Application for Accession to the EU and Regular Reports on the Candidate Countries' Progress towards accession released by the Commission demonstrates that the CoE standards have on some occasions been adopted as cornerstones of the Commission's assessment of the pre-accession progress achieved by the candidate countries in the fi eld of human rights protection. Similarly, requests to conduct reforms in certain areas included in the Accession Partnerships are often identical to the recommendations made some time earlier by the CoE Committee of Ministers, 108 although no reference to the CoE experience is made.
Unable to assess the whole spectrum of human rights protection issues included by the Commission in the Copenhagen-related documents (which is the subject for a book, not a brief note like this), the paper will concentrate on several issues where the infl uence of the CoE and the commission have acted together to resolve human rights problems in the candidate countries. The similarities between what the CoE and the European Commission recommend are very telling.
Comparing the Copenhagen-related documents and the documents issued earlier in relation to the CoE's monitoring of the same countries, two levels of similarity can be outlined:
a) The general level -i.e. the similarities concerning the lists of issues outlined as problematic and requiring action;
b) The issue-specifi c level -mostly consisting of recommendations issued by the CoE and the EU organs to deal with the same issue appearing on the list.
a. Borrowing at the general level
The similarities between the EU and CoE monitoring are most evident at the general level -which is also the most important one, since in order to solve problems effectively it is necessary fi rst to outline their scope. To see the similarities better, consider the issues listed as "problematic" by the CoE and the EU in relation to the reforms going on in two countries: Romania and Estonia. The choice of these countries is not by chance: fi rst and foremost, these are the only two countries in relation to which the CoE monitoring was fi nished by the time the European Commission released its Opinions on their application for Membership of the EU. 109 Secondly, the pace of reform in these countries differed greatly, ultimately resulting in the admission of Estonia to the EU in May 2004, while Romania is an acceding country.
In the case of Romania, CoE monitors outlined a number of issues of concern. PACE Resolution 1123 (1997) on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Romania, and PACE Recommendation 1326 (1997) on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Romania drew attention to the need for reform in the following areas: independence of the judiciary; 110 the rights of homosexuals; criminalisation of insult and defamation;
111 the situation in prisons; 112 the situation of children in orphanages; 113 restitution of property; 114 Roma rights and the fi ght against racism and xenophobia. 115 If improvements were not made in these areas, monitoring would have to be reopened. 116 The Opinion on Romania's application for membership of the EU, issued by the European Commission roughly half a year after the CoE closed its monitoring, focused inter alia on the following issues: problems related to the penalties laid down in the Criminal Code for false reporting and defamation; 117 restitution of property to the churches and to Jewish organisations;
118 lack of respect of privacy; unsatisfactory access of asylum seekers to justice and accommodation; poor conditions in the coun-tries' prisons; 119 abuses of homosexuals' rights through the vague Criminal Code provision dealing with "public scandal"; 120 the critical situation regarding the rights of the child, 121 which "may improve shortly"; 122 the situations of the Hungarian and Romanian minorities. 123 In the following years, the Commission's assessment generally moved along similar lines, following the path opened by the CoE.
Even more importantly, the issues outlined by the CoE made their way into the Accession Partnerships with Romania. The fi rst one, released in 1999, for example, included among the short-term priorities the issue of the necessary reform of childcare institutions and Roma rights, 124 and repeated the same concerns (coupled with the demilitarisation of the police) among the mid-term priorities. The Commission, in turn, focused, among other things, on the following aspects of Estonian reform:
132 the fact that capital punishment had not been abolished in Estonia;
133 the lack of access to legal aid; 134 the ill-treatment of prisoners, although mention was made of some steps forward in relation to the treatment of asylum-seekers. 135 A relatively large section of the Opinion was devoted to the situation of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, 136 focusing on the differences in the status of citizens and non-citizen residents, problems of the integration of the minority and, specifi cally, linguistic integration. As if to better refl ect the stress placed by the CoE, further Reports by the Commission introduced a special structural arrangement of information contained in sections devoted to the assessment of minority protection in Estonia, reserving special sections for an assessment of the naturalisation of non-citizens and the granting by the authorities of residence-permits to non-citizens. 137 Just as in the case of most of the other Opinions and Reports released by the European Commission, the work done by PACE is not mentioned at all.
A comparison of the issues outlined by the Commission in the course of the pre-accession exercise and by the CoE in the course of the PACE monitoring addressed in the context of reforms progressing in other countries of the region reveals precisely the same level of similarity. This is not to say that the sets of issues are identical. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of the issues addressed coincides seems to be of importance.
b. Borrowing at the issue-specifi c level
The situation changes slightly once one moves from the general comparison of the sets of issues outlined by the EU and by the CoE as problematic to the area of the remedies proposed by the two. While placing issues on the agenda is extremely important, the importance of providing ways to deal with the problems outlined is also essential. Strange as it may seem, the Commission does not appear to be very willing to provide 131 PACE Rec. 1313 (1997), para 2(ii). 132 Just as in the case of Romania, for the lack of space, the author does not provide an account of those aspects of human rights protection which the European Commission did not consider problematic. 133 European Commission, Opinion on Estonia's application for membership of the European Union, 16. 134 Ibid 135 Ibid, 17. 136 Ibid, 17-20. 137 See: European Commission, Regular Reports on Estonia's progress towards accession to the European Union of 1998 and 1999. remedies to deal with problems in the candidate countries. Moreover, it is generally not very demanding, mostly confi ning its Reporting to the changes implemented in the candidate countries, often without accompanying it with any assessment -negative or positive. Even more importantly, the assessment of the Copenhagen-related documents seems to suggest that the human rights related issues which do not constitute part of the acquis communautaire are less likely to be included in the Accession Partnerships and thus are not promoted actively by the Commission (probably the most notable exception being the treatment of minorities, and especially of the Roma). Sometimes, the Commission's demands that fall outside the scope of the acquis remain unmet by the candidate countries, notwithstanding their inclusion among the priorities of the accession partnerships. 138 Generally, such a situation is not surprising. Having chosen problematic areas in the human rights protection in the candidate countries in general (with no regard to whether a certain issue falls within the scope of the acquis or not), the Commission needed to take a step further to promote reforms in these specifi c fi elds. However, lacking the general human rights protection standard, it was unable to provide effective guidance to the candidate countries in the areas which were not part of the acquis, since, understandably, the Commission mostly enjoys expertise and in-depth knowledge of the issues situated within the scope of the acquis and not other issues -especially those which are almost totally outside the acquis, such as, for example, the establishment of the post of Ombudsman or non-discrimination in the course of the restitution of property. 139 These instances once again demonstrate that however broadly interpreted it is, the scope of the acquis still remains limited.
Frequently basing its Reporting in the spheres lying outside the scope of the acquis on the fi ndings of the CoE and on the documents 138 The lack of success in the Commission's promotion of the adoption of the law on the restitution of property in Poland can serve as an excellent example: the issue appeared in a number of Copenhagen-related documents, but Poland entered the European Union without such legislation. Another example is the totally unsuccessful promotion of the post of ombudsman in Bulgaria: started in 1997, it has been absolutely fruitless. released by this institution, the Commission usually adopts a part of the available CoE standard, sometimes diminishing the substance of the right whose protection it is entrusted to assure under the Copenhagen criteria. A huge number of examples can be provided to illustrate this statement. This note will concentrate on two: the fi rst is the implementation by the Commission of the elements of PACE Recommendation 924 (1981) on Discrimination against Homosexuals in its reporting, 140 EC, 145 adopted in implementation of Article 13 EC, expressly states that any discrimination based inter alia on sexual orientation "will be prohibited", 146 in recognition of the fact that "discrimination based on […] sexual orientation may undermine the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty", 147 the situation in this fi eld was quite different when the Commission's regular reporting started. With the lack of prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, the issue has been treated indirectly, via rights to privacy and human dignity. 148 Since the issue fell outside the scope of the acquis, the Union had no standard to measure the candidate countries' compliance with it. Moreover, the reporting started in an atmosphere where the ECJ refused to award protection to homosexuals discriminated on the grounds of their orientation. 149 This fact was refl ected in the way the Commission looks at this right in the pre-accession period.
The Opinions and Regular Reports released by the Commission focus on the following issues: decriminalisation of homosexual acts 150 and the application of the same age of consent. 151 The latter was a serious problem for the CEECs: according to the European Parliament, in the year 2000 discrimination based on the age of consent, for example, existed in Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania. 152 The Commission (probably following the ECJ judgement in the Grant case) never mentions the necessary guarantee of equality of treatment of homosexuals! The essence of the right was thus forgotten. Nevertheless, a partial adoption of the CoE standard in this fi eld is evident. A parallel can be drawn between the Commission's use of the CoE documents and the ECJ, recognising the principles of the ECHR and interpreting them in the light of EC law, as it stands. This impression is further reinforced when one considers the other examples of the use of the CoE in the promotion of a specifi c issue of reform by the European Commission. Dealing with the promotion of the post of Ombudsman in the candidate countries, the Commission, once again, was faced with an issue falling outside the scope of the acquis. The fact that the EU, too, has an Ombudsman 153 does not change the essence: it has no grounds to interfere in such aspects of institutional development in the Member States as the promotion of Ombudsman posts. During pre-accession, however, the Commission considered that putting "a well established Ombudsmen system" 154 in place was a necessary step towards further democratisation. The same idea -that the Ombudsman is a necessary organ in a democratic state -has been promoted by the CoE since 1975, 155 long before the European Ombudsman was put in place. The most important documents adopted by the CoE in the fi eld are CM Recommendation No. R (85) 13 "On the Institution of the Ombudsman" of 23 September 1985 and a more detailed PACE Recommendation 1615 (2003) "The Institution of Ombudsman", adopted 18 years later. As usual, the Commission did not mention any of these documents in its Reports.
The approach to the issue taken by the CoE is more balanced compared to that adopted by the Commission. First of all, the CoE clearly promotes the creation of such posts in the CoE member states where it does not exist. Secondly, the CoE formulated a list of qualities the Ombudsman's offi ce should possess in a democratic society, a task the Commission was unwilling to do. In other words, by promoting the creation of the Ombudsman post, but being silent on the essence of the organ, the Commission made the candidate countries turn, among other things, to the CoE experience in the fi eld of Ombudsman promotion, which could clarify the essence of the Ombudsman's status and competences.
Conclusion
The systems of monitoring the compliance of the new member countries of the CoE and the candidate countries of the EU to their human rights commitments are similar in many respects. While the EU has elaborated a sophisticated pre-accession human rights monitoring system to effectively implement the principle of conditionality, the CoE system is no less advanced and is even superior to that of the EU in some re- spects. Most importantly, the system of standards employed by the CoE during its monitoring is much better articulated than that of the EU. These monitoring systems -one pre-, another post-accession -are largely complementary. Given that the CoE has already successfully enlarged to embrace the European continent almost in its entirety, it is up to the EU to benefi t from the human rights standards devised by the leading human rights protection organisation in the world for its post-accession monitoring.
The cooperation between the two organisations is growing, as evi- Moreover, a move to enhance cooperation between the CoE and EU in this sphere would also mean the continuation of the processes that have already started in the course of the preparation of the fi fth enlargement. In the fi elds where its expertise was lacking and clear human rights standards (elaborated by the EU) missing -most notably while dealing with those aspects of human rights protection that generally fall outside the scope of the acquis communautaire -the European Commission was already largely relying on the experience of the CoE. This was done at two levels: at the general level of agenda setting and at the level of the promotion of concrete reforms and innovations.
Given the reality of the fi fth enlargement, it becomes clear that a move towards a somewhat more formal incorporation of the CoE monitoring system within the EU pre-accession is already possible in the preparation for accession of the present candidate countries, i.e. Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. Such a move will capitalise on existing practice, making the accession process more reliable and effi cient.
